I. INTRODUCTION

The outcomes in Staten Island
11 A finding of liability in Section 1983 actions is important. When a city is found liable, for example, a "'societal interest'" is served, an interest that is greater than the one obtained by an individual litigant's "compensatory award." 12 Furthermore, a finding against a city deters future constitutional violations. 13 Do prelitigation settlements that do not involve findings of liability, against cities or individuals officers, violate the purpose of Section 1983? Following the $6.4 million settlement obtained by the family of Freddie Gray, one article asked if the large settlement would "send[] the right message."
14 Settlement-based deterrence was represented as a false hope. According to Kami Chavis-Simmons, "a former assistant United States attorney who now directs the criminal justice program at the Wake Forest University School of Law," "[t]hat's how people in a perfect world would like these settlements to work: the more you pay, the more careful you are," but in reality, settlements are not effective tools "for widespread reform." 15 What, then, was the purpose of the Freddie Gray settlement, "a payment larger than all police-brutality suits [in Baltimore] since 2011"
16 ? Moreover, accelerated civil rights settlement stands in sharp contrast to recent landmark federal litigation arising out of NYPD stop-and-frisk procedures, which caused the largest city in the country to change the way it conducts its police work.
Trial in the stop-and-frisk litigation occurred five years after the case was filed, and the court's remedial order was implemented six years postfiling. 17 It had a measurable impact on life in New York City, but required years of discovery and fights over nearly every motion filed. 18 Accelerated civil rights settlements, like the one obtained by the Gray family, may not be catalysts for social or legal change in the same way the stop-and-frisk litigation was. An accelerated civil rights settlement is different. It moves quickly: the settlements studied in this Article all settled in 12 months or less. There is no discovery, no motion practice, no trial, and 11 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 591 (1978) . 12 Douglas L. Colbert, Bifurcation of Civil Rights Defendants: Undermining Monell in Police Brutality Cases, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 499, 525 (1993) (quoting Owen v. City of Independence, Mo., 445 U.S. 622, 653 (1980) (internal quotations omitted)). 13 Id.
14 Henry Gass, The Freddie Gray $6.4 Million Settlement is Big, but will it Send Right Message?, C.S. MONITOR (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/0909/TheFreddie-Gray-6.4-million-settlement-is-big-but-will-it-send-right-message [https://perma.cc/UBG 3-2XYF]. 15 Id. . 18 The New York stop-and-frisk litigation is described infra at Part III.
no remedial order to implement. The settlements reached are extraordinarily large. In cases involving high-profile deaths, accelerated civil rights settlement represents an important and novel use of Section 1983. This Article is the first to identify and define the phenomenon. Following this introduction, Part II examines how the families of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Freddie Gray, and Walter Scott have obtained accelerated civil rights settlements. Part III explains that accelerated civil rights settlement is unlike the heralded civil rights model known as impact litigation, but that it is a defensible and innovative strategy that avoids hurdles section 1983 plaintiffs cannot overcome, including qualified immunity and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons 19 standing issues. Part IV argues that accelerated civil rights settlement fits neatly into the history of Section 1983, a statute whose purpose adapts to different historic eras, answering each one's needs. It concludes that accelerated civil rights settlement relies on Section 1983 to respond to today's crisis: police action that results in the loss of black lives.
II. THE PHENOMENON OF ACCELERATED CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS
Amadou Diallo. Manuel Loggins Jr. Ronald Madison. Kendra James. Sean Bell. Eric Garner. Michael Brown. Alton Sterling. Each was a black man or woman who died at the hands of police. Their names represent only a handful of such cases since 1999, when Diallo, an unarmed man standing in a New York City doorway, was gunned down by officers who erroneously thought he had a gun.
20
Following the deaths of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Freddie Gray, and Walter Scott, there was some expectation that the officers involved in their deaths would be brought to justice-criminal justice. So far, none have been convicted of a criminal offense. The victims' families are frustrated. 21 Crowds of protestors around the country shared their frustration. 22 The details of each death became well known, but still, criminal convictions could not be obtained. 19 461 U.S. 95 (1983 The failed prosecutions received significant press coverage, but thereafter, the families garnered less and less attention. Each family's quest for justice became a seemingly lost cause. Perhaps there were too many subsequent deaths, too little mental space left over to simultaneously track how each victim's family was coping.
But victims' families have continued on. The families of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Freddie Gray, and Walter Scott reached financial settlements with the cities in which their loved ones died. 23 The families had viable Section 1983 claims, but chose early settlement over protracted litigation. The settlements these families obtained are large, 24 signaling that the families caused the cities they targeted to fear civil rights litigation. Signaling this fear, North Charleston's city attorney described the Scott settlement as "a lot of money," that helped the city avoid "the potential for a very large verdict." 25 The litigation strategy employed by the victims' families is not the kind of strategy that brings about societal or even widespread change. The notice of claim describes items of damage as, inter alia, "loss of civil rights," and seeks punitive damages and attorneys' fees. 45 Unlike state law tort claims, Section 1983 does "include the potential recovery of attorneys' fees." 46 In July 2015, Eric Garner's family "agreed to a settlement with New York City for $5.9 million." 47 The City did not admit liability, though New York City's Comptroller, Scott Stringer, described the settlement as "in the best interests of all parties." 48 One of the Garner family attorneys, Jonathan C. Moore, stated, "if no settlement was reached by [July 2015], a lawsuit would have been filed." 49 Moreover, the New York City Comptroller admitted that the settlement was intended to settle the Garner families' civil rights claims. It followed months of negotiations, and was among the biggest settlements reached so far as part of a strategy by Mr. Stringer, to settle major civil rights claims even before a lawsuit is filed. He has said the aim is to save taxpayers the expense, and families the pain, of a long legal process. He said five lawyers from his office were involved in the negotiations, which ended on Monday. . 48 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 49 Id. 50 Goodman, supra note 34. 51 Id.
Garner's mother commented that victory would be declared on her son's behalf "when we get justice."
52 One of Garner's children, Emerald Snipes, defined justice as the moment in which "somebody is held accountable for what they [did] ." 53 Though no one was held criminally accountable for his death, the city that employed the officer who used a fatal chokehold on Eric Garner had to answer to his family. They paid his family a multimillion dollar settlement. No family member had to endure cross-examination at trial about Garner's death. No family member had to submit to intrusive deposition questioning. No one had to endure emotionally and physically taxing trial preparation. Eric Garner's future earnings' potential did not need to be disclosed in discovery. Indeed, no one needed to draft, review or file a federal civil rights complaint.
When Eric Garner's mother Gwen Carr filed a notice of claim that expressly mentioned civil rights claims arising out of her son's death, along with her intention to seek attorneys' fees for the same, she accelerated settlement of her Section 1983 claims. In fact, she accelerated the settlement so effectively that her litigation began with the filing of a four-page notice of claim and ended after the parties settled out of court. There was no litigation in between.
54
B. The Laquan McDonald Settlement
On October 20, 2014, seventeen-year-old Laquan McDonald was shot and killed in Chicago. 55 In general, excessive force precedent is not friendly to Section 1983 plaintiffs.
78
The qualified immunity defense applied in Plumhoff has been so broadened that it excuses almost any police conduct challenged through a civil rights action. 79 Qualified immunity motion practice would have likely defeated Hunter's claims.
But the McDonald family never had to fight a motion to dismiss based on a qualified immunity defense. Like Eric Garner's family, Laquan McDonald's family settled without filing a federal civil rights action. Unlike the Garner family, the McDonald family avoided filing anything, even a notice of claim. Rather, the possibility of civil rights litigation lingered in the background of settlement negotiations.
There was no discovery, no expert witness reports and no trial. The City that might have been sued in a federal civil rights action was instead held responsible for 71 See, e.g., Plumhoff v. Rickard, 134 S. Ct. 2012 Ct. , 2020 Ct. (2014 
C. The Freddie Gray Settlement
Freddie Gray died in Baltimore on April 19, 2015. 80 He was twenty-five. 81 Gray suffered a spinal injury one week earlier while in police custody. He died of severe neck injuries suffered in the back of a police van, which he rode in while "shackled and handcuffed, but not secured in a seat belt."
82 Six officers involved in his death were charged in state proceedings for crimes ranging from murder to manslaughter.
83
One officer's trial ended with a hung jury, three more were acquitted after bench trials, and the charges against the remaining officers were dropped.
84
In September 2015, Gray's family settled with the City of Baltimore for $6.4 million. 85 Baltimore's mayor explained that the settlement was intended "to bring an important measure of closure to the Gray family, to the community and to the city."
86
The mayor also added that the settlement would "avoid years and years of protracted litigation."
87
The Gray family's lawyer described the settlement as "civil justice." 90 A retired federal judge mediated the settlement. 91 Had the matter not settled, the Gray family would have brought suit in federal court. 92 This information, along with the settlement's express provision that it settled Section 1983 claims and attorneys' fees available under Section 1983, indicates that the mere possibility that a Section 1983 action could be filed resulted in accelerated civil rights settlement.
D. The Walter Scott Settlement
On April 4, 2015, Walter Scott of North Charleston, South Carolina, was shot in the back and killed by police officer Michael Slager. 93 Scott was unarmed. 94 He was originally pulled over for a broken taillight. 95 McDonald's family, the Scott family could have also sought attorneys' fees. Yet no lawsuit needed to be filed and another family was saved from the pain of prolonged litigation. Instead, accelerated civil rights settlement brought a quick resolution.
III. ACCELERATED CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENT STRATEGY
Since 1871, federal law has provided a cause of action for plaintiffs whose constitutional rights were violated by an actor acting under color of state law. But civil rights litigation brought pursuant to Section 1983 can take more than five years to reach an outcome, and plaintiffs face nearly insurmountable defenses. If no one can be sued for violating the Constitution under Section 1983 as a result of immunity defenses, then federal courts cannot remedy constitutional violations through Section 1983.
102
Despite these obstacles, one group of talented plaintiffs' lawyers recently used Section 1983 to successfully challenge stop-and-frisk practices in New York City. Section 1983 litigation had an impact on the city practices it challenged. However, because the suit sought only injunctive relief, the stop-and-frisk plaintiffs recovered no damages.
105
Though the Garner, McDonald, Gray, and Scott families could have also pursued impact litigation, they instead chose accelerated civil rights settlement. The ways in which their techniques differ from the impact litigation model are described below.
Impact litigation, at its best, matches motivated attorneys with sympathetic plaintiffs who are committed to bringing about changes in law and policy to benefit the plaintiffs themselves and society as a whole. 106 Impact litigation often involves certifying a class of plaintiffs, and may seek injunctive relief instead of damages. As a result, there may be tension between an impact litigation attorney's goal of facilitating social change and an individual plaintiff's personal litigation expectations. 107 Impact litigation's objective is not neutral. Derrick Bell argued that impact litigation "can and should" gain and exploit political leverage. 108 Finally, even if impact litigation is successful in obtaining a positive outcome for plaintiffs, their counsel's work often continues after judgment enters, as consent decrees must be monitored for compliance. 109 
The most infamous example of impact litigation is Brown v. Board of Education,
110 "the NAACP's national test case campaign to desegregate the nation's schools." 111 The case is regarded as "the epitome of American ideals about how to use public impact litigation to promote public interest objectives." 112 In the Section 1983 context, impact litigation, which "aim[s] at systemic reform that [does] not necessarily benefit the specific plaintiff(s)," is controversial. 113 The New York City stop-and-frisk litigation is a recent example of successful yet controversial Section 1983 impact litigation. The Daniels plaintiffs won class certification, and negotiated a sweeping settlement, which required the NYPD to create a written policy regarding racial profiling compliant with the United States and New York Constitutions, to train officers regarding the same, and to ensure compliance with the policy. 117 The NYPD was also required to complete a written form each time they conducted a stop-and-frisk (known as 'UF-250 Reports'), provide plaintiffs' counsel with quarterly data regarding these reports until 2007. 118 Plaintiffs' counsel recovered $3.5 million in fees and costs, an amount that dwarfed the plaintiffs' $167,500 total recovery.
119
In January 2008, relying on data collected as a result of Daniels, Floyd v. City of New York, 120 also a Section 1983 action, was filed. 121 The same attorneys who represented the plaintiffs in Daniels also represented the plaintiffs in Floyd. Floyd, like Daniels, alleged that the NYPD engaged in stop-and-frisk practices that violated the Fourth Amendment. 122 The Floyd plaintiffs also won class certification. 123 In 2013, five and a half years after the case commenced, after a three month bench trial, the Floyd plaintiffs were granted a broad injunction against the NYPD, which, inter alia, appointed a monitor to oversee stop-and-frisk practices, required a "community-based joint remedial process to be conducted by a court-appointed facilitator," and ordered that one precinct in each of New York City's boroughs place body-worn cameras on their police officers. 124 The ruling received positive press coverage around the world. 125 Though the case took strange procedural twists, including one that caused the removal of the judge who presided over the Daniels' settlement and the Floyd trial, 126 it also had a tremendous impact in New York City. Bill de Blasio won the mayoral election in November 2013 after running a campaign in which he voiced support for the Floyd plaintiffs and promised to end the City's stop-and-frisk practices. 127 By 2014, the plaintiffs and the City were engaged in a much less adversarial resolution of the case; as a result of their collaboration, a monitor was appointed. He provided recommendations that would help implement the 2013 remedial order.
128
On January 24, 2017, the parties settled the fees, costs and expenses in Floyd.
129
Plaintiffs' counsel will receive $10,430,000 in fees, and $820,000 for costs and expenses. 130 The plaintiffs withdrew their damage claims thirteen days before the 2013 bench trial, 131 so they recovered nothing.
The Floyd litigation has its roots in a case that was filed in 1999. 132 A permanent injunction entered in 2013, and the remedies it ordered continue to be implemented. 133 However, the only claims remaining at the time of trial were for injunctive relief. 134 This ensured that the case would culminate in a bench trial in front of a judge who had issued several plaintiff-friendly rulings, but also meant that plaintiffs involved in the lengthy litigation would never receive compensation for the constitutional violations they suffered. Finally, the litigation was protracted and costly-the City of New York will pay over $10 million in attorneys' fees. 135 Still, there is no question that the litigation shed light on racial profiling disguised as Terry stops. It even influenced a mayoral election. 136 The change it brought about, which includes widespread use of police body cameras, 137 is significant and positive. The families' settlements ranged from $5 million to $6.5 million. As a result, millions of dollars in attorneys' fees do not appear as disproportionate as they did in Daniels and Floyd. In Daniels, attorneys' fees totaled $3.5 million, and the plaintiffs recovered only $167,500 total. 139 In Floyd, attorney's fees exceeded $10 million, whereas the plaintiffs' recovered no damages. 140 With respect to attorney's fees, the accelerated civil rights settlement seems fairer.
Still, one of the lawsuits brought by the families highlighted above might have finally improved the law governing plaintiffs' section 1983 claims. The deaths of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Freddie Gray, and Walter Scott received nationwide attention and their families might have made for sympathetic plaintiffs.
Yet, avoiding qualified immunity motion practice was a smart move. Qualified immunity is a "nearly insurmountable obstacle" that "protects 'all but the plainly incompetent [officer] or those [officers] who knowingly violate the law."' 141 Avoiding a litigation scenario in which defendants can raise a qualified immunity defense is a legitimate strategic decision for plaintiffs worried about the risk of losing and walking away with no damages and no improved law.
What if the families had filed Section 1983 actions that sought injunctions against New York City, Chicago, Baltimore, or North Charleston? Would they have succeeded in ending the practices that caused the victims' deaths? Perhaps, as in Floyd, they too might have obtained change at a municipal level.
Yet seeking injunctive relief against a city requires proving virtual certainty of "future injury" as a result of the Supreme Court's holding in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 142 another hurdle most plaintiffs cannot overcome. 143 Avoiding Lyons also makes strategic sense.
Most importantly, it is not the families' responsibility to bring about social change. They are entitled to seek relief that does nothing more than affect their lives. Despite the national outcry over the deaths of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Freddie Gray, and Walter Scott, these four individuals were brothers and uncles and fathers and sons before they became symbols of a national antipolice brutality movement.
IV. SECTION 1983'S ACCELERATED CIVIL RIGHTS SETTLEMENT CHAPTER
There are differences between the Floyd Section 1983 impact litigation model and the settlements obtained through accelerated civil rights settlement by the families of Eric Garner, Laquan McDonald, Freddie Gray, and Walter Scott. Yet neither strategy is more consistent with section 1983's purpose. Section 1983 has evolved in each era in which it has been invoked. Its malleability has ensured its relevance. Using it to quickly and efficiently obtain large settlements following high-profile deaths, without seeking any corollary social change, does not betray Section 1983. Rather, accelerated civil rights settlements represent nothing more than another chapter in the chameleon statute's history.
Many have traced Section 1983's evolution, from its promising beginning, followed by its period of dormancy, to its resurrection in the 1960s. 144 This Article follows a similar historical route, but does not try to divine the plain meaning, legislative intent, or policy underlying the famed statute. Section 1983's language is broad but vague. 145 The statute's purpose and underlying policy are flexible, used to justify different outcomes in different eras. 146 Professor Jack Beerman has explained that "[t]he text and history of [Section] 1983 cannot themselves establish the boundaries of the statute's enforcement." 147 There is no need to mark boundaries that do not exist. Instead, this section tracks the evolving purpose Section 1983 has served in different historical eras. First, it examines the rallying cry of Section 1983's statutory predecessor, Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act. Second, it acknowledges how this radical piece of legislation went unused for nearly one hundred years. Third, it discusses the role Section 1983 played in delegitimizing law enforcement racism in the 1960s. [NO. 3
This historical investigation supports the way Section 1983 litigation has been recently used by the families of the victims of high-profile police-involved deaths. Section 1983 has multiple purposes, and all victims of constitutional wrongs can claim it as their weapon-either through classic impact litigation or as a settlement incentive.
A. Reconstruction Era Revolution
Section 1983 is perhaps "the most well known and commonly litigated civil rights statute." 148 It came to life during reconstruction, a specific historical context that lasted "a brief span of nine years, 1866 to 1875," during which Congress implemented legislation to protect the freedoms granted to those who were recently enslaved.
149 "Reconstruction . . . established a new legal order that contemplated direct federal intervention in what had been considered to be state affairs, a system in which federal courts were to enforce newly created federal constitutional rights against state officials through civil remedies and criminal sanctions." 150 If successful, reconstruction might have weakened or even eradicated the South's "racial caste system." 151 But each reconstructionist gain was met with severe backlash, including the Ku Klux Klan's "terrorist campaign." 152 The Ku Klux Klan, formed in 1866 by six white men in a Pulaski, Tennessee law office, "engaged in extreme violence against freed slaves and Republicans," assaulting and murdering its victims and destroying their property. 153 The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, was a "bold effort[]" to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 154 but also represented a Congressional reaction to the Klan's presence in Southern states. 155 Section 2 of the Act seemed to have the Klan directly in mind; it created civil and criminal consequences for "conspir[ing] together, or go [ing] in disguise upon the public highway or upon the premises of another for the purpose . . . of depriving any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or equal privileges or immunities under the laws." Section 1, now codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, provided a civil cause of action against an officer who should have protected an individual whose civil rights were injured, and "was specifically directed against lynching and other forms of mob violence." 157 It targeted not just the Klan, but the Klan's government and law enforcement allies. 158 The Ku Klux Klan Act had a noble purpose, that of "mak[ing] secure the constitutional ideals of freedom and equality for all," providing federal protection for civil rights. 159 It represented "a comprehensive congressional strategy to challenge the violent resistance to Reconstruction." 160 Generally, Section 1983 is understood "to provide a remedy for the violation of federal rights," 161 even if "the specific evil at which the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (the predecessor of § 1983) was originally aimed" was "race discrimination." 162 Section 1983, like other reconstruction era statutes, intended "to protect the recently freed slaves and their champions against state interference and, in some cases, from private violence." 163 As a result, one view of Section 1983 is that it targeted a "limited historical problem," that is, post-Civil War racial violence prompted by the end of slavery. 164 In particular, it targeted the racial violence in the South undertaken by the Klan, "and the failure of the states to cope with that violence." 165 
B. Nineteenth Century Irrelevance
In several decisions, beginning with 1873's Slaughter-House Cases, 166 the Supreme Court limited the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and the statutes passed pursuant to the power it granted Congress. 167 By 1882, the Court had voided the Ku Klux Klan Act's criminal conspiracy section, a provision "aimed at lynchings and other mob actions of an individual or private nature." 168 As a result of the Court's narrowed construction of both the Fourteenth Amendment and the civil rights statutes enacted pursuant to it, the Ku Klux Klan Act's "scope and effectiveness" shrunk. 169 The Court never directly addressed Section 1 of the Act, but those sections of the Act left "largely forgotten." 170 Civil rights protection was abandoned at the federal level. 171 States stepped into the legal void, drafting legislation that provided legal reinforcement for a racial caste system that endorsed different treatment based on perceived racial difference. 172 In 1892, newly enacted laws segregated trains, and segregation soon spread into "streetcars, restaurants, washrooms, and residential communities." 173 In place of civil rights protections, "[t]he South was . . . enabled to create and perpetuate its rigid rules of segregation. Lynchings, race riots and other forms of unequal treatment were permitted to abound in the South and elsewhere without power in the federal government to intercede." 174 During this period, reconstruction reforms died, and Jim Crow ruled, 175 "restrict[ing] every step an African American could make," where "[a]ny breach of the system could mean one's life." 176 For fifty years, the Supreme Court exalted states' rights, "and disregarded notions of equality, . . . destroying the legal regime produced by the Civil War, except insofar as it transformed those rights into protections of gilded age corporations from government regulation." 177 Though legislative progress stalled, civil rights movements coalesced. In 1887, T. Thomas Fortune founded the Afro-American League ("AAL"), which "supported reactive court battles and proactive legislative reform; establishment of equal civil and political rights and an ultimate goal of economic justice; and intrarace self-help and interracial coalition politics aimed at eliminating poverty for all persons regardless of race." 178 Members of the AAL helped establish the Afro-American
Council ("AAC") in 1898. 179 The AAC's objectives included fighting lynching, testing the constitutionality of oppressive laws, promoting laws that "in the individual States shall secure to all citizens the rights guaranteed them by the 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments to the Constitution," and both prison and educational reform.
180
In 1905, a group of black intellectuals met on the Canadian side of Niagara Falls and established the "Niagara Movement," with W.E. Du Bois as its leader.
181
The movement adopted a declaration of principles that, like the AAL and AAC, emphasized the need for suffrage, equal treatment in public places, and economic opportunity.
182 But unlike the AAL and AAC, the Niagara Movement looked to the state to provide education to all. 183 It also "singled out for protest the system of 'Jim Crow' cars," criticizing how it forced nonwhites to "pay first-class fare for thirdclass accommodations, render [them] open to insults and discomfort and to crucify wantonly [their] manhood, womanhood and self-respect."
184
In 1909, a founding conference was held for the National Negro Conference, later renamed the NAACP. 185 The storied organization would spend decades building legal strategies to undo segregation and racial oppression through targeted legal challenges.
Southern resistance to Jim Crow also began to coalesce into organized strategic action. In 1890, a year after Louisiana first passed Jim Crow laws, New Orleans lawyer Louis A. Martinet formed the Citizens' Committee, "to offer legal resistance to the 'separate' railroad car law of Louisiana."
186 Homer Plessy was also a member, and his decision to test segregation laws was a planned move designed to create an 179 Id. at 1524-25. 180 discrimination. 201 In 1948, the Supreme Court held that when enforced by the judiciary, racially restrictive covenants represented state action that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 202 The restrictive covenant litigation's innovative use of social science research and policy arguments "would prove crucial to civil rights cases" that followed-including Brown. 203 But Section 1983 remained inactive. 204 As of the 1950s, the tremendous promise of the civil rights statutes had been whittled down to "a pitiful handful of statutory provisions, most of which [were] burdened by the dead weight of strict constructionism." 205 
C. Modern Vehicle for Social Change
Civil rights activists had been organizing formally and informally for decades before the NAACP achieved victory in Brown. Still, the 1950s is the era fairly characterized as the period in which the civil rights movement emerged; that is, the period in which national and federal attention took note of its efforts and followed its lead. 206 In 1961, Section 1983 finally caught up, roaring back to life in a case that offered a historical treatise on the legislative history of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, but also implicitly condemned racially motivated Fourth Amendment violations.
The defendant in the case that changed civil rights litigation was Frank Pape, Chicago's Chief of Detectives. 207 By the late 1950s, Chicago was "marred" by racial tension. 208 On October 27, 1958, Pape himself arrived at the scene of Peter Saisi's death; his wife Mary Saisi, a white woman, reported that two "young Negroes" had confronted her husband and fled. 209 While reviewing mugshots, she identified James Monroe as one of the men she saw confront her husband. 210 Pape and twelve additional officers raided Monroe's home, entering in the early morning hours without a warrant. 211 Monroe was held at a stationhouse but released after Mary Saisi failed to identify him in a lineup. 212 Monroe brought suit in federal court; his complaint alleged that:
evolved from a law meant to combat "[r]acial attitudes in the South, blossoming in the form of Klan and other violence, and the failure of the states to cope with that violence," 222 into a "general federal remedy for violations of all constitutional rights." 223 But aside from remedying constitutional violations, Section 1983 became a way to challenge racial discrimination, so long as that racial discrimination was also constitutionally problematic.
By the early 2000s, Section 1983 had gained a symbolic value: representing legal recourse "to protect citizens from abusive state action, to ensure a broad antidiscrimination ethic, and to fix the wrongs of Jim Crow." 224 In practice, modern Section 1983 litigation has focused on violations of the Fourth or Eighth Amendments. 225 In recent years, it served as the cause of action used to change stop-and-frisk practices in New York. Most recently, it has acted as a warning: engage in accelerated settlement, or expensive civil rights litigation will follow.
V. CONCLUSION
It has taken imagination and intellectual creativity to convert section 1983, a law borne of a specific historical crisis (reconstruction-era violence against freed slaves) into the most significant statutory vehicle used to combat modern law enforcement discrimination (NYPD Terry stops made without reasonable suspicion, to note one example). In accelerated civil rights settlements, Section 1983 is more of a threat than a weapon, looming in the background of prefiling settlement negotiations related to police-involved shootings. It is never directly employed but is still very much present.
This begs the question of whether the settlements Walter Scott's family and others obtained were in fact settlements under the Civil Rights Act of 1871 if there was no civil rights action attached to it. Aside from the possibility of a Section 1983 action each family could make reference to in their settlement negotiations, there are contextual similarities that merit including these settlements in the civil rights pantheon.
First, there are parallels between the violence that inspired the 1871 Act and the acts resulting in the deaths underlying the settlements studied in this Article. In 1871, freed slaves faced violence meant to preserve a status quo that robbed them of property rights and physical integrity. Whatever advancements were made postslavery were met with a violent reversal of fortune "so crushing that historians called it the Nadir." 226 Now, "police assaults on black people" make it seem as [NO. 3 though "we have reentered the past and are living in a second Nadir." 227 Images of white supremacists wearing KKK hoods in the streets of Charlottesville only reinforce the notion that history is repeating itself. 228 In 1871, Congress responded to mob violence with the Civil Rights Act. In the wake of twenty-first century police violence, the families of the victims have responded with successful requests for compensation when the criminal justice system failed to convict their loved ones' killers.
Second, the largest settlement described in this Article, the $6.5 million obtained by Walter Scott's family, was influenced by the settlement amounts obtained by the families of Freddie Gray and Walter Scott. That is, just as lawyers research jury verdicts to determine whether a trial is worth the risk, cities are now taking note of accelerated civil rights settlements to determine if they should meet settlement demands. Accelerated civil rights settlements are functioning as persuasive precedent arguably as impactful as the qualified immunity precedent that keeps civil rights victims out of court.
Third, the accelerated civil rights settlements described herein stand in sharp contrast to the litigation outcome obtained by another family whose loss is perhaps the most well-known of all the recent black lives lost to police violence. With respect to time, effort and emotional investment, accelerated civil rights settlements appear to have cost much less than the litigation described below.
On August 9, 2014, eighteen-year-old Michael Brown of Ferguson, Missouri, was shot and killed by police officer Darren Wilson. 229 Brown was walking in the middle of the road with a friend, Dorian Johnson. 230 Wilson pulled his police car in front of Brown and Johnson, and a struggle between Brown and Wilson ensued through the police car's window. 231 Wilson shot at Brown, Brown fled, and "[w]hen Brown stopped to face the officer, Wilson fired several shots at his front, killing him." 232 The Brown civil rights litigation appeared exhausting, at least emotionally. No parent wants to dig through her dead son's childhood medical records. Michael Brown's parents arguably endured litigation induced trauma that the four families highlighted above avoided.
But just as it is unfair to preference the Floyd model of Section 1983 litigation over the accelerated civil rights settlement model, it too is unfair to criticize the way Michael Brown's family sought civil rights justice. Giving the Brown parents some agency is paramount. Claudia Rankine has suggested that what Michael Brown's mother, Lesley McSpadden, sought to reestablish after her son's death was a sense of control. After all, the Ferguson Police Department left Michael Brown's body in the street. McSpadden was kept away from her son's body because it was evidence. She was denied the rights of a mother, a sad fact reminiscent of pre-Civil War times, when as a slave she would have had no legal claim to her offspring. McSpadden learned of her new identity as a mother of a dead son from bystanders . . . . After Brown's corpse was finally taken away, two weeks passed before his family was able to see him. This loss of control and authority might explain why after Brown's death, McSpadden was supposedly in the precarious position of accosting vendors selling T-shirts that demanded justice for Michael Brown that used her son's name. Not only were the procedures around her son's corpse out of her hands; his name had been commoditized and assimilated into our modes of capitalism.
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If McSpadden wanted to vindicate her son's death through a civil rights action, her choice should be respected.
Still, the Brown family endured an ordeal in federal court litigation. Their Section 1983 litigation seemed to inflict new wounds. It is this visceral aspect of litigated civil rights actions that makes accelerated civil rights settlement a compelling alternative. In addition to the way the violence it responds to echoes the violence that inspired Section 1983's statutory predecessor, and how settlement after settlement is influencing city's approach to victims' families' demands, accelerated civil rights settlement is a new and noteworthy response to an age-old attack on constitutionally protected rights.
